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Athens and Macedonia, in the Absence of Alexander 

Christopher W. Blackwell, edition of July 1, 2005

page 4 of 9

· Three Seeking Harpalus · · Introduction to the Crisis ·

We are trying to answer the question, Why did three Macedonian embassies all fail to secure Harpalus from the Athenians?, and so this first chapter of argument will found and justify that question by (1) describing briefly the background to Harpalus’ flight, (2) narrating the events of the “Harpalus Affair” and setting out a chronology for them, (3) discussing the evidence for the Macedonian envoys who came to seek Harpalus, and (4) discussing in what way and to what extent the Harpalus Affair was a crisis for the Athenians. By the end of this chapter, I hope to have shown not only that three embassies came to Athens, but also that Athenian anxieties regarding Alexander’s treasurer focused on this multiplicity of demands.

· Background to Harpalus’ Flight ·

Harpalus had been Alexander’s companion since his youth and had even gone into exile with him after the Pixodorus Affair.22 Harpalus was physically unfit for service in the army, but when Alexander assumed leadership in Macedonia he put the man in charge of the treasury (Arr. 3.6.5-6).23 Shortly before the battle of Issus, in 333 BC, Harpalus left his post and went to Megara for a year with a man named Tauriscus, after which he returned to his office in Asia (Arr. 3.6.7; Plut. Alex. 41.4). Arrian describes the affair as a “flight” or “exile” (φυγή ) (3.6.3), and Tauriscus as a “bad man” (κακὸς ἀνήρ) who persuaded (ἀναπεισθείς ) Harpalus away (3.6.7), thus leading most scholars see these events as precursors to Harpalus’ later, more famous, and more consequential flight.24

Because Harpalus returned so easily to his powerful position, it is also possible that his “flight” was actually a mission for Alexander.25 B.M. Kingsley offers a persuasive argument that Harpalus went to Megara in order to facilitate Alexander’s distribution of grain to his supporters among the Greeks.26 During his stay in the Megarid Harpalus developed ties with several prominent Athenians, among them Phocion and Charicles (Diod. 17.108.6; Plut. Phoc. 21-22). Plutarch says that these two Athenians provided for Harpalus’ orphaned daughter after his death in 324 or 323 (Plut. Phoc. 22.1). He may even have been granted Athenian citizenship for his service to the city, if we can believe a satyr play (the Agēn) quoted by Athenaeus (13.586d):27

And I hear that Harpalus sent tens of thousands of medimnoi of grain to themno less than Agēn’s giftand that he became a citizen. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάσσονας σίτου διαπέμψαι καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι. The only evidence we have concerning Harpalus’ official works between his return to Asia and his final flight comes from Curtius and Diodorus, who say that in 326 he sent 12,000 men and 25,000 panoplies to Alexander in India (Cur. 9.3.21; cf. Diod. 17.108.9).28 There is, however, more evidence for Harpalus’ personal life in Tarsus while Alexander was campaigning to the east. Diodorus says that “he doubted that Alexander would return” (ἀπέγνω τὴν ἐπάνοδον αὐτοῦ ), that he lived extravagantly at Alexander’s expense, and particularly that he spent lavish sums on the Athenian ἑταῖραι Pythonicē and Glycera (Diod. 17.108.4-6; Curt. 10.1.45; Athen. 586b-d = FGrH 137 F 30, 594d-596a).29

· Harpalus’ Flight, Arrest, and Escape30  ·

By the end of 325 BC, Alexander had emerged from the Gedrossian desert and reached Carmania; he reached Susa in early 324 (Arr. 6.27.3; Curt. 9.10.20).31 During the winter of 325/4 Alexander began to purge his Asian territories of officials who had misbehaved during his absence. The sources tell of eleven such executions and several other men of rank who either died or disappeared from their posts.32 Harpalus was in Babylon, only a few hundred miles from Susa, and so must have heard of Alexander’s mood quickly.33 He fled from Babylon early in 324 and took with him 5,000 talents from the treasury; upon reaching the Aegean coast in mid-March (or possibly on his journey there), he collected an entourage of 6,000 mercenaries and crossed the sea with them in thirty ships (Diod. 17.108.6; Curt. 10.2.1).34

In early February, shortly after Harpalus had fled, Alexander announced at Susa his “Exiles Decree”ordering the Greek states to reenfranchize their political exilesand Nicanor was dispatched to bring the decree to Greece (Arr. 6.27.3; Curt. 10.1.1).35 From Susa to the coast was a journey of at least three months, and probably took Nicanor, traveling in state, somewhat longer. He was to promulgate the decree at the Olympic festival, which was to take place from July 31 to August 4 of 324.36 He probably reached Greece at the beginning of June.

We know that Harpalus first crossed the Aegean after Nicanor’s arrival in Greece. Hyperides says (In Dem. 18): Harpalus fell upon Greece so quickly that everyone was surprised; and he found the affairs in the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece in this state because of Nicanor’s arrival and the orders which he had brought with him from Alexander, orders concerning the exiles and the leagues of the Achaeans and Arcadians and Boeotians. [Ἅρπαλος οὕτως ἐξαίφνης] πρὸς τ[ὴ]ν Ἑλλάδα προσέπ?[ε?]σεν, ὥστε μηδένα προαισθέσθαι· τὰ d*) ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ Ἑλλάδι οὕτως ἔχοντα κατέλαβεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφίξεως τῆς Νικάνορος καὶ τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων ὧν ἧκεν φέρων par*) Ἀλεξάνδρου περί τε τῶν φυγάδων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκά[δ]ω?ν καὶ Β]ο?ι?[ω?]τ?ῶ?[ν ? ? ? ? ?37

We also know that Harpalus must have come before the end of July. The first time Harpalus, with his whole fleet, reached Sunium he was denied admittance (Curt. 10.2.1; Diod. 17.108.7; Plut., Mor. [Vit. X Or.] 846a). He then sailed to Taenarum in the Peloponnese, left most of his mercenaries there, and “became a suppliant to the Athenian people” (ἱκέτης ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου ) (Diod. 17.108.6). This time he was admitted by Philocles, who was “general of Munichia and the shipyards” (στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν Μουνιχίαν καὶ τὰ νεώρια ) (Din. In Phil.; I.G. II2 1631, 380-384).38 W.B. Dinsmoor has shown that the archon-year 325/4, the year in which Philocles held his office, was intercalary, and so ended on July 21, 324.39 So Harpalus must have appeared at Athens in late June or early July, 324.40

Harpalus’ first attempt to enter Athens seems to have startled and frightened the Athenians. An officer of Alexander seeking admittance as a private citizen would itself have been a strange enough occurrence to give people pause;41 one arriving with an army and a fleet, at a time when Athens was divided in its sympathies toward Alexander, must have seemed more ominous yet.42 Even when Harpalus returned with only two ships and 700 talents,43 Philocles may have admitted him against the orders of the assembly (Din. Phil. 1-2).44 Once Harpalus had entered the city, he became the focus of a dispute between parties and over issues that it is our purpose to explain over the course of this study. For the sake of a narrative sketch, it will suffice to say that the Athenians were confused regarding what to do with Harpalus. Demosthenes persuaded them to immure the errant treasurer for the time being, and to keep his money on the acropolis (Hyp. In Dem. 8).

While Harpalus was in Athens, Demosthenes was appointed ἀρχεθέωρος, Athens’ representative to the Olympic festival (Din. In Dem. 82; Hyp. In Dem. 19). He went west to the games, presumably to discuss with Nicanor the Exiles Decree and the related question of Athens’ cleruchy on Samos.45 In the first half of August, Demosthenes returned from Olympia, and Harpalus escaped from Athens (Diod. 17.108.7).46 When this news came out, it was also discovered that half of his money had disappeared. Demosthenes was under suspicion (Hyp. In Dem. 12; Plut. Phoc. 21; Athen. 8.342f), but himself proposed that the council of the Areopagus investigate the matter and issue a report (Din. In Dem. 4; Hyp. In Dem. 1). The Areopagus inquired into the matter for six months (Din. In Dem. 45), and finally released a report blaming several people for having taken bribes.47 Demosthenes was among them, as was the orator Demades;48 the subsequent trial, in March of 323 BC, that gives us our two priceless, if sadly deficient, contemporary sources for the Harpalus affair, the speeches that Hyperides and Dinarchus wrote against Demosthenes.49

· The Macedonian Embassies ·

I have so far skipped over the Macedonian demands for Harpalus’ extradition. These demands and the envoys who brought them to Athens are the focus of this study and so require special attention. The remainder of this chapter will treat the number of embassies, whom they represented, how they fit into our chronology, and what role they played in elevating the Harpalus Affair from an incident to a crisis.

The least equivocal evidence tells us that one Philoxenus demanded Harpalus’ extradition. Plutarch says that once Harpalus was in Athens, “suddenly Philoxenus appeared on the scene” (ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος ) (Mor. [De Vit. Pud.] 531a). C. Adams was among the first modern historians to doubt, despite the passage in Plutarch, that Philoxenus arrived in person; Adam’s contrary view is based on conficting evidence from one of our eyewitness accounts (Hyp. In Dem. 8):50

…for when, Jurors, Harpalus came to Attica and those from Philoxenus who were demanding him back were likewise introduced to the Assembly… …ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἦλθεν ἄνδρες δικασταὶ Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐξαιτοῦντες αὐτὸν ἅμα προσήχθησαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον

Appearing before this assembly, according to Hyperides, were representatives from Philoxenus (οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Φιλοξένου ἐξαιτοῦντες αὐτὸν ) and not the man himself.51

But who was Philoxenus? The author of the Plutarchan Moralia calls him τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός , “general of affairs at sea” (Mor. [De Vit. Pud.] 531a). Polyaenus (Strat. 6.49) calls him Ἀλεξανδρου βασιλέως ὕπαρχος Ἰωνίας , “the King Alexander’s Satrap of Ionia”. Berve calls him satrap of Caria, on the strength of Arrian 7.23.1, in which Philoxenus meets Alexander at Babylon in 323, στρατίαν ἄγων ἀπὸ Καρίας, “leading an army from Caria”.52 There is ample evidence that this Philoxenus was a rather important figure in the military structure of Alexander’s Asian territories. When Harpalus had returned from his year’s absence in the Megarid a decade earlier, 333 BC, Alexander assigned Philoxenus to collect taxes west of the Taurus mountains (τῆς Ἀσίας τὰ ἐπι τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου ἐκλέγειν ) and moved Harpalus into Philoxenus’ former position (Arr. 3.6.7).53 There is other evidence bearing on Philoxenus’ involvement with Harpalus, which seems to have been energetic. Pausanias (2.33.4) says that after Harpalus escaped from Athens Philoxenus chased him and his men all over the Aegean, finally seizing Harpalus’ paymaster (διοικητής ) at Rhodes. So Philoxenus was in Alexander’s good graces from 333 until 323; he was possibly satrap of Caria, and certainly a commander of forces near the western coast of Ionia with authority over a fleet. As such, he would have known of Harpalus’ flight as soon as anyone and would have been in an excellent position to act. Since Harpalus’ initial, failed, attempt to enter Athens with his entire entourage must have taken at least a few weeks, we can easily imagine Philoxenus dispatching representatives by sea who would have arrived in time to come before the people at the same time (ἅμα ) as Harpalus.

Philoxenus is not the only Macedonian mentioned in connection with Harpalus’ flight to Athens. Diodorus refers to Harpalus ἐξαιτούμενος δὲ ὑπ?̓ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ὀλυμπιάδος , “demanded by Antipater and Olympias” (17.108.7). Plutarch, too, says this in his account of Demosthenes’ involvement with Harpalus (Mor. [Vit. X Or.] 846b): And when [Harpalus] sailed in, bringing a thousand Darics, [Demosthenes] changed sides. And when the Athenians wanted to surrender the man to Antipater, Demosthenes opposed the idea, and moved that they store away the money on the Acropolis, but he did not tell the people how much money there was. ἐπειδὴ d*) εἰσέπλευσε λαβὼν Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους μετετάξατο· βουλομένων t*) Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ παραδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, ἔγραψέ t*) ἀποθέσθαι τὰ χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰπόντα·

So according to our evidence, some combination of Antipater, Olympias, and Philoxenus sought Harpalus’ extradition. Hyperides mentions only Philoxenus; Plutarch mentions Philoxenus at Mor. [De Vit. Pud.] 531a and Antipater at Mor. [Vit. X Or.] 846b; and Diodorus mentions Antipater and Olympias (17.108.7).

These sources do not appear to be consistent, and modern scholarship has reached no agreement on a solution, although the question has been addressed specifically only once.54 An uneasy majority accept the sum of the sources, believing that Antipater, Olympias, and Philoxenus each sent embassies to Athens requesting the surrender of Harpalus. But even among those who agree on three embassies, there are differing explanations of why three, and why these three.55 Some have seen little significance in the fact, agreeing with G. Colin: “le fait sûr est que les autorités macédoniennes, comme il était naturel, réclament énergiquement sa livraison.” 56 P. Green thinks that the multiple demands for Harpalus contributed to the debate among the Athenians.57 Others complicate the problem by suggesting that either Olympias or Antipater or both were acting on their own initiative in this matter.58 And the most suggestive statement on the subject comes from Badian, who seems to link (at least temporally) Antipater’s involvement in the Harpalus affair with Alexander’s eventual request that Craterus take over as “Regent” of Greece: When Harpalus appeared in Athens, Antipater asked for his extradition, as did his enemy Olympias andclearly going outside his own province into Antipater’sPhiloxenus. The multiplicity of demands is interesting, but was self-defeating. It was soon followed by the order for Antipater’s supercession andsomewhere in these months, though we cannot tell whereAntipater’s firm disapproval of Alexander’s plans for deification.59

Badian’s suggestion was an important impetus for the present work, but before pursuing it further, it is necessary to see differing opinions on the Macedonian envoys and address the difficulties presented by our fragmentary and contradictory sources.

R. Sealey agrees that Philoxenus, Antipater, and Olympias were involved, but believes that the latter two issued their demand jointly.60 K. Beloch, despite the best evidence to the contrary, does not mention Philoxenus at all, only Antipater and Olympias.61 C. Mossé thinks that Antipater alone issued a demand, and Jaschinski mentions only Philoxenus.62

We should note that all of these scholars’ interests lay elsewhere, that the Macedonian envoys were incidental to their studies. The only argument specifically devoted to the Macedonian requests for Harpalus is Ian Worthington’s 1984 article in the Liverpool Classical Monthly, in which he argues that there were no envoys from Antipater and Olympias.63 Worthington points out that our eyewitnesses, Hyperides and Dinarchus, mention no one other than Philoxenus. Further, he says, “since the prosecution [Hyperides and Dinarchus] was out to create as much prejudice against Demosthenes as possible, it is very unlikely that envoys from other Macedonians would not be mentioned.” And he concludes: In this case, it is better to rely on the first-hand evidence of Hypereides (who, we should imagine, would have been more prone to falsify facts and employ rhetorical exaggeration) rather than Plutarch or Diodorus. Plutarch supplies two names at different parts in the Moralia: he cannot be read with certainty when stating that Philoxenus himself came to Athens (531a), and probably named Antipater later (846b) since, as regent of Greece, he would be the logical person to receive Harpalus. This last point may well have been Diodorus’ reason for including Antipater, but demands from Olympias are even more questionable. Therefore it is plausible to assume that Philoxenus alone sent demands for the surrender of Harpalus.64

The problem of Hyperides’ and Dinarchus’ silence is real, and before continuing to build a historical structure on the basis of three embassies, we need justification for doing so. The argument against three envoys stands on three propositions:

1. That the scattered references in Plutarch’s Moralia are inconsistent and therefore untrustworthy. 2. That Diodorus’ inclusion of Olympias is unlikely, and this calls into question his reference to Antipater as well. 3. That Hyperides mentions only Philoxenus, when we would expect him to mention as many Macedonians as possible, even if he had to invent them. We may examine these individually, moving from the least to the most fundamental objection to three Macedonian embassies.

Plutarch says (Mor. [De Vit. Pud.] 531a) that Philoxenus appeared in person: ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος . Elsewhere he mentions, not Philoxenus, but Antipater (Mor. . [Vit. X Or.] 846b): βουλομένων t*) Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ παραδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον . There are problems here, but not ones that necessarily force us to dismiss these statements from the Moralia as unreliable.

The passage at 531a is difficult because it seems to conflict with what Hyperides says (Dem. col. 8): “…those from Philoxenus demanding him…” (οἱ παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐξαιτοῦντες αὐτὸν ). Hyperides clearly refers not to Philoxenus himself, but representatives of Philoxenus. Such a conflict is not particularly devastating, and certainly does not discredit Plutarch’s evidence altogether. The verb ἐπεφάνη at Mor. [De Vit. Pud.] 531a is not necessarily equivalent to ἦλθεν ; if we translate “showed himself” or “came into view”, Plutarch is reconciled with Hyperides.65 But even if we do not grant that latitude in translation, Plutarch’s error is small and easily understood. Pausanias tells us (2.33.4): Harpalus, when he stole away from the Athenians, taking his ships to Crete, was killed there not long after, by some of his servants. They say that he was treacherously killed by a Macedonian man, Pausanias. His paymaster fled to Rhodes and Philoxenus seized him there, who had also demanded Harpalus from the Athenians. Ἅρπαλος μὲν ὡς ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἀπέδρα διαβὰς ναυσὶν ἐς Κρήτην, οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ὑπὸ τῶν θεραπευόντων ἀπέθανεν οἰκετῶν· οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνδρὸς Μακεδόνος Παυσανίου δολοφονηθῆναί φασιν αὐτόν. τὸν δέ οἱ τῶν χρημάτων διοικητὴν φυγόντα ἐς Ῥόδον Φιλόξενος Μακεδὼν συνέλαβεν, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸν παρὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐξῄτησεν Ἅρπαλον.66

Pausanias’ description of events is relevant for two reasons. First, he shows that Philoxenus was active in the Aegean in 324, and second, that he demanded Harpalus, although Pausanias does not specify whether he did so in person or by proxy. If Plutarch relied on a source such as Pausanias’, we can readily see how envoys dispatched by Philoxenus could become Philoxenus himself.

Mor. [Vit. X Or.] 846b, where Plutarch mentions Antipater but not Philoxenus, does not compare to 531a, and therefore the two do not conflict. At 531a Philoxenus is demanding Harpalus. At 846b the Athenians are “wishing to surrender the man to Antipater”. These passages would present a problem only if we assume that the Athenians discussed Harpalus on only one occasion, and there is no reason to assume so.67

So these two passages from Plutarch’s Moralia do not conflict with each other, but there remains the problem of 846b (Antipater) and Hyperides’ speech. These two do indeed seem to describe the same situation, an assembly at which the Athenians discussed Harpalus, but where Plutarch mentions a desire to give Harpalus to Antipater, Hyperides specifies “those from Philoxenus”. To address this will involve a discussion of Hyperides’ and Dinarchus’ speeches, and so this remaining problem with the Moralia should remain temporarily abeyant while we examine Diodorus’ reference to Antipater and Olympias.

Diodorus refers to Harpalus as “demanded by Antipater and Olympias” (ἐξαιτούμενος δὲ u(p*) Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ὀλυμπιάδος ) (17.108.7). Worthington suggested that Diodorus mentions Antipater because “he would be the logical person to receive Harpalus,” but that “demands from Olympias are even more questionable.” 68 Both of these statements are certainly true, especially if, for “questionable” we understand, “demanding of explanation”. I would suggest two reasons for accepting Diodorus’ account, at least tentatively. First, we might borrow from palaeographers the principle of the lectio difficilior: if Diodorus mentioned Antipater, not based on evidence but only according to likelihood, then why mention Olympias, whose presence here is quite surprising? At any rate, it is a methodologically questionable practice to dismiss one source because it adds, without contradiction, to the picture painted by others. Furthermore, to dismiss Diodorus’ evidence would be to use an ex silentio argument from one very fragmentary source (Hyperides)or two if we include Dinarchus, who mentions no embassies at allto dismiss one of the most important and complete sources for the history of the period. We would be justified in doing so only if there were a compelling reason to think that Hyperides could have helped his case by mentioning other Macedonians. Worthington says that he could have, but an examination of Hyperides’ and Dinarchus’ speeches suggests otherwise.

While these orations are particularly valuable as contemporary texts by eyewitnesses to the events, they do not represent the final word on affairs they mention. Speeches from the Athenian law-court are documentary, not historical; they are topically specific and occasional, not diegetical.69 Neither Hyperides nor Dinarchus set out to create a “monument for eternity”; both were interested simply in persuading a jury of Demosthenes’ guilt and moral inferiority. As S. Todd writes, “It seems clear that it is on the level of ‘events’ that the orators are at their most unreliable; and that the attempt to write narrative history on the basis of these sources is doomed to failure.” 70 That having been said, the very lack of self-conscious historiography in these speeches increases their value to us, an uninvited audience. These speeches have worth, but a worth that we cannot judge apart from the context of the trial.

The issues at hand are (1) whether we can trust Hyperides’ statement that representatives from Philoxenus arrived demanding Harpalus’ extraction, and (2) whether we should use Hyperides’ and Dinarchus’ silence regarding Antipater and Olympias to dismiss evidence from the Moralia and Diodorus. The first is the easiest to accept. Hyperides is describing an assembly of the δῆμος to an audience of jurors who were likely participants therein. Accordingly he could probably not have expected to get away with an overt lie. Nor would he probably have tried to lie here, since his mention of “those from Philoxenus” is clearly subordinate to the point he is makinghow Demosthenes manipulated the peoplethrown in merely to set the stage. We may accept it with confidence.

The problem of our orators’ silence regarding Antipater and Olympias is more difficult. The first thing we should note is that neither Hyperides nor Dinarchus gives a summary of the events they are treating. Dinarchus readily admits as much at the outset of his speech against Demosthenes (Dem. 1): Many things have already been said by Stratocles, and most of the charges have been advanced, and regarding the report itself, the one from the council of the Areopagus, many true and just opinions have come forward, and Stratocles has spoken on succeeding events and has read the motions pertaining to them. So, what remains, my fellow Athenians, for us who are prosecuting a case of a magnitude never before occurring in the city, is to make a general exhortation to all of you. First, we ask that you be sympathetic, should we happen to labor certain pointswe don’t say things twice to weary you, but rather to raise your ire all the more…. πολλῶν d*) ὑπὸ Στρατοκλέους εἰρημένων, καὶ τῶν πλείστων προκατειλημμένων κατηγορημάτων, ØκαὶØ περὶ μὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀποφάσεως τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς δικαίας καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἀποδείξεις εἰρηκυίας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκολούθων τούτοις Στρατοκλέους εἰρηκότος καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματ?̓ ἀνεγνωκότος ἤδη τὰ περὶ τούτων, ὑπόλοιπον ἡμῖν Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ tau=t*) ἀγωνιζομένοις ἀγῶνα τηλικοῦτον, ἡλίκος οὐδὲ πώποτε γέγονεν [2ἐν]2 τῇ πόλει, κοινῇ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν παρακελεύεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἡμῖν συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἂν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνίοις περιπίπτωμεν οὐ γὰρ ἵν?̓ ἐνοχλῶμεν ὑμᾶς, a)ll*) ἵνα ὀργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον παροξύνωμεν, δὶς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν….

This rambling sentence, of which only part is quoted here, goes to great lengths to remind the jury of all that they have already heard, much of it coming from Stratocles, the orator who gave the first speech against Demosthenes. In fact, Dinarchus is clearly sensitive to the dangers of repetitiousness, apologizing in advance for anything he or his colleagues might say that would seem redundant. Of course, we do not know how much detail came out in Stratocles’ speech, and it is possible that Dinarchus’ reference to it is misleading. Worthington would minimize Stratocles’ role in the trial and the information contained in his opening oration: “Because of his youth Stratocles may have given what amounted to an introductory speech simply setting out the charges, which was followed by a longer one delivered by Dinarchus’ client.” 71 Perhaps, but we do find an interesting reference to Stratocles further along in Dinarchus’ oration. He is describing Demosthenes’ role in the destruction of Thebes in 335 BC and in particular his dealings with the Arcadians. At 20 he mentions that the Arcadian leader Astylus was open to bribery, ὥσπερ καὶ Στρατοκλῆς εἶπε , “just as Stratocles also said.” If Stratocles’ speech treated not only the current charges against Demosthenes and the report of the Areopagus, but also covered events a decade earlier, we might suspect that it was more than a short introduction.

So we have reason to believe that the authors of our extant orations were not under pressure to provide their audience with a full narrative account. At col. 8 of his speech, Hyperides describes the assembly immediately after Harpalus’ arrival. His purpose seems to be to raise questions regarding the advice Demosthenes gave the people and its motivation. The orator mentions Philoxenus here, but only in passing, by way of describing the scene when Demosthenes made his argument. It is quite possible that only “those from Philoxenus” were present then, and so the orator mentioned only them.

Worthington also argued, however, that the orators would have been motivated to mention as many Macedonians as possible, because doing so would further their case against Demosthenes.72 But this does not actually seem to have been the case. Hyperides does not focus on Philoxenus, as we have seen, and Dinarchus does not mention him at all. So if mentioning Macedonians in connection with Harpalus was strategically valuable, these orators seem to have done a poor job.

We can find, in addition, good reasons why Hyperides and Dinarchus would want to mention as few Macedonians as possible. According to Hyperides, Demosthenes advocated holding Harpalus with this argument (In Dem. 8): [Demosthenes was] saying that the city would do well not to surrender Harpalus to those from Philoxenus, nor would any blame from Alexander need befall the δῆμος on account of that man. φάσκων οὔτε τοῖς παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐλθοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν τὸν Ἅρπαλον ἐγδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν οὔτε δεῖν αἰτίαν οὐδεμίαν τῶι δήμωι di*) ἐκεῖνον par*) Ἀλεξάνδρου καταλείπεσθαι.

Badian has pointed to the significance, for our understanding of these events, of this evidence “that Demosthenes proposed to turn down Philoxenus’ demand, yet asserted that Athenians could avoid offending Alexander.” 73 The most widely accepted explanation is that Demosthenes advocated holding Harpalus, “until Alexander should send a fully accredited representative to take both [Harpalus and the money] over.” 74 In other words, it was not clear that Philoxenus actually represented Alexander, but it seemed that the Athenians could expect gratitude from Alexander for showing caution regarding his treasurer and treasure. We can, however, imagine Demosthenes’ argument to have been plausible only if there were good reasons for suspicion regarding Philoxenus, such as the presence of other, well-established representatives of Macedonia. But for Hyperides to omit mention of them makes Demosthenes’ argument less intelligible.

Demosthenes was charged with stealing, or accepting as a bribe, some of Harpalus’ money. Since this money actually belonged to Alexander, its theft put the Athenians in a potentially dangerous position. Dinarchus dwells on the danger in his speech, asking (rhetorically) what would happen if Alexander suddenly demanded his money back (Dem. 66-69). Dinarchus goes back and forth between accusing Demosthenes of stealing from Athens (15) and accusing him of stealing from Alexander (Din. Dem. 68-69, 89), but the result is the same: both Hyperides’ and Dinarchus’ speeches seek to convince an audience that Demosthenes was motivated entirely by his greed for Harpalus’ gold.

The passage in which Hyperides mentions Philoxenus consists of a long hypotactic sentence that moves from Harpalus’ arrival, through the assembly, to Demosthenes’ proposal and its acceptance. All the background is subordinated to the statement that Demosthenes, and Demosthenes alone, persuaded them to keep Harpalus and store the gold on the Acropolis. Demosthenes ordered an official accounting of the money, regarding which Hyperides says (col. 9): He did this not in order to learn the amount of money, how much was there, but rather, as it seems, so that he might see about how much he could earn for his pay. οὐχ ὅπως πύθοιτο τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπόσα ἦν, a)ll*) ἵνα εἰδῇ a)f*) ὅσων αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸν μισθὸν πράττεσθαι.

Hyperides portrays Demosthenes as motivated solely by greed, a lust for Macedonian gold. This is why, the jury is to believe, Demosthenes wanted to keep Harpalus in Athens.

This rhetorical attack on Demosthenes demands that the situation be as clear as possible. Like a chemist, Hyperides needs to remove all other variables from his tincture, leaving only Demosthenes, greed, gold, and Philoxenus. If Hyperides had mentioned that there was some confusion over to whom to surrender Harpalus, he would have reminded the jury that Demosthenes had a good, honest, patriotic reason for suggesting that they keep Harpalus around. By mentioning only one Macedonian, Philoxenus, he can more easily portray Demosthenes’ motives as wholly selfish.

By the same token, if Antipater or Olympias or both sent embassies sometime after the initial assembly, we could then explain why Hyperides does not mention them in his speech. Since the arrival of other envoys would confuse the situation and would show clearly that Demosthenes’ cautionary advice had been sound, we would hardly expect his prosecutors to focus on that subject during the trial.

In fact, there is one brief mention of Demosthenes and Olympias. In a badly damaged section of Hyperides’ speech we find this (col. 20): …sent by Demosthenes, and Callias the Chalcidian, the brother of Taurosthenes, with Olympias. For Demosthenes moved that these become Athenians citizens, and he makes use of them most often. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? [ὑπὸ]
[Δη]μ?οσθένο[υς ἀπο-]
-στ?αλείς, παρὰ [d*) Ὀλυμ-]
πιάδι Καλλίας [Χαλ-]
κιδεύς, Ταυροσθέ-
-νους ἀδελφός· τούτους
γὰρ ἔγραψε Δημοσθέ-
νης Ἀθηναίους εἶ-
ναι καὶ χρῆται τούτοις
-πάντων μάλιστα. There is no way to tell, from the text we have, what is going on here, but it does suggest that there was contact between Olympias and Athens during the course of these events.

To summarize the evidence regarding Macedonian demands for Harpalus. Hyperides and Dinarchus, our eyewitness (and biased and incomplete) reporters, say that Philoxenus demanded Harpalus from the Athenians. Diodorus, our principal narrative source (who is often confused and spotty), says that Antipater and Olympias demanded Harpalus. The Plutarchan Moralia say, at one place, that Philoxenus demanded Harpalus, and at another that the Athenian considered surrendering the man to Antipater. Finally, we have seen not only that the orators had a motive for omitting references to Macedonians, but that Demosthenes’ argument regarding Harpalus is intelligible only if there were more than one demand. We should accept the evidence from Hyperides, Diodorus, and the Plutarchan Moralia that the Athenians faced demands from Philoxenus, Antipater, and Olympias.

· The Embassies and the Crisis ·

Our primary evidence for the Harpalus affair, scanty as it is, does suggest a chronology for these Macedonian demands. A narrative of that chronology, in turn, is suggestive of how the Harpalus Affair evolved as a crisis, in Athenian eyes. Athens initially feared that Harpalus was leading an invasion, an unsurprising reaction to the unannounced advent of thirty Macedonian warships. Dinarchus reminds his audience of the first appearance of Harpalus, “whom you thought to have arrived intending to seize your city” (ὃν h)/|sqeq*) ἡκεῖν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν ) (In Arist. 4). When, later, Philocles admitted Harpalus to Athens, he did so against the orders of the assembly (Din. In Phil. 1, 7). From this point I would propose the following sequence of events. At least some Athenians, frightened of what consequences might follow Harpalus, wanted to surrender the man immediately; it would have been most logical to give him over to Antipater, the Macedonian general in Greece. Here we fit Plutarch Mor. (Vit. X Or.) 846b: And when [Harpalus] sailed in, bringing a thousand Darics, [Demosthenes] changed sides. And when the Athenians wanted to surrender the man to Antipater, Demosthenes opposed the idea, and moved that they store away the money on the Acropolis, but he did not tell the people how much money there was. ἐπειδὴ d*) εἰσέπλευσε λαβὼν Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους μετετάξατο· βουλομένων t*) Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ παραδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, ἔγραψέ t*) ἀποθέσθαι τὰ χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰπόντα·

Demosthenes was successful in this proposal because representatives from Philoxenus arrived and appeared before the Assembly. He complicated matters, but because this second Macedonian arrival also proved not to be an invasion, the problem of Harpalus seemed less urgent. Here we may fit two more pieces of evidence. Plutarch says (Mor. 531a): And the example of Demosthenes is a good reminder at this point: when the Athenians had undertaken to help Harpalus and were equipping themselves against Alexander, suddenly Philoxenus appeared on the scene, who was the general of naval matters for Alexander. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἐνταῦθα καλῶς ἔχει διαμνημονεύειν· τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν καὶ κορυσσομένων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός.

With Philoxenus’ arrival, it became clear that Harpalus was, for the time being at least, a diplomatic problem rather than a military one. If the Athenians were to give Harpalus up, to whom should they give him? Antipater, who had been Alexander’s arm in Europe since 335? Or this Philoxenus? Demosthenes advocated delay as the course least likely to be mistaken and to bring Alexander’s anger (Hyp. In Dem. 8; cf. Din. In Dem. 89-90): For when Harpalus came to Attica, jurors, and he and the men from Philoxenus asking for him came before the people, then Demosthenes came forward and made a long speech saying that it was not a good idea for the city to hand Harpalus over to Philoxenus’ men, and that there would be no blame from Alexander because of the man, but that the safest course for the city would be to guard the money and the man, and to carry away to the acropolis all the money that Harpalus had brought, on the very next day. [ἐπ]ειδὴ γὰρ ἦλθεν ἄν]δρες δικα[σταὶ Ἅρπα]λ?ος εἰς τὴν [Ἀττικὴ]ν? καὶ οἱ πα[ρὰ Φιλοξέ]νου ἐξαι[τοῦντες α]ὐ?τὸν ἅμα [προσήχθης]α?ν πρὸς [τὸν δῆμον, τότε παρελθὼν Δημ]οσθένης [διεξῆλθεν] μ?α?κ?ρὸν [λόγον, φά?]ς?κων οὔτε [τοῖς παρ]ὰ Φιλοξέ[νου ἐλθο]ῦσι καλῶς [ἔχειν τὸν?] Ἅρπαλον [ἐγδοῦναι τ?]ὴν πόλιν [οὔτε δεῖν] αἰτίαν οὐ[δεμίαν τ]ῶι δήμωι di*) ἐκεῖνο]ν par*) Ἀλεξάνδρο]υ καταλείπεσθαι, ἀσφαλέστατον d*) εἶναι τ?[ῆι πόλει] τά τε χρήματα [καὶ τὸν] ἄνδρα φυλάτ[τειν] καὶ ἀναφέρει[ν τὰ χρήματα ἅπα[ντα] ε?ἰ?ς? [τὴν] ἀκρόπολιν [ἦ]λθ[εν] ἔχων Ἅρπαλος εἰ[ς τὴν] Ἀττικήν ἐν τῇ αὔρι[ον ἡμέραι.75

After Harpalus was immured and his money confiscated to the Acropolis, further embassies arrived from Antipater and Olympias (Diod. 17.108.6): And demanded by Antipater and Olympias, and having given much money to those orators who had been his advocates, he escaped and slipped off to Taenarum and his mercenaries. ἐξαιτούμενος δὲ u(p*) Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ὀλυμπιάδος καὶ πολλὰ χρήματα διαδοὺς τοῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δημηγοροῦσι ῥήτορσι διέδρα καὶ κατῆρεν εἰς Ταίναρον πρὸς τοὺς μισθοφόρους.

Diodorus’ present participle (ἐξαιτούμενος ) makes Antipater’s and Olympias’ demands contemporaneous with Harpalus’ bribery, which would suggest that these demands were made after the Athenians had admitted him. The further demands for the treasurer would have vindicated Demosthenes’ policy of caution. Antipater and Olympias were considerable presences in Greece, and to have given Harpalus to Philoxenus might have angered these other two. Furthermore, no Macedonian fleet materialized, and no army swept down from Pella. Demosthenes went to the festival at Olympia, met with Nicanor, and sometime later Harpalus escaped.

After Harpalus’ escape, Athenian anxieties seem to focus on the missing gold, and what would happen if Alexander were to demand it back. A year after Harpalus arrived, Dinarchus would call Philocles “the one who was the first cause of the gold that was distributed” (τὸν ἀρχηγὸν γενόμενον τοῦ διαδεδομένου ), omitting on this occasion all reference to the man who actually carried the gold from Asia to Athens (In Phil. 7). Dinarchus’ speech against Demosthenes further illuminates this point (Dem. 66-69): And what iffor we ought to consider thiswhat if, because of Demosthenes’ decree, Alexander sends word to us that he wants the gold that was brought into our country by Harpalus, and in addition to the fact that the Council’s report has been written, he sends back to us the slaves that have by now returned to him, and expects us to learn the truth from them? By the gods, men, what would we say? Would you propose that we fight a war, since we so successfully managed our previous wars? τί d*) [ἐάν] τιθῶμεν γὰρ ταῦτα ἐὰν κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Δημοσθένους ἀπαιτῇ πέμψας ἡμᾶς Ἀλέξανδρος τὸ χρυσίον τὸ κομισθὲν εἰς τὴν χώραν u(f*) Ἁρπάλου, καὶ πρὸς τῷ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασιν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν ὡς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοῖ πυνθάνεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν [ἡ]μᾶς, πρὸς θεῶν ἄνδρες τί ἐροῦμεν; γρά[ψ]εις σὺ Δημόσθενες πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς πρότερον πολέμους καλῶς διῴκησας;

The decree (ψήφισμα ) of Demosthenes would have compelled the Athenians to repay Alexander, as the orator explains later in section 69 of the speech. The report (ἀπόφασις ) is the product of the Areopagus’ investigation into Harpalus’ missing money and possible bribery.76 The slaves (τὰ δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ) must be the servants of Harpalus whom Philoxenus captured, since these are said to have named the Athenians whom Harpalus bribed (Paus. 2.33.4-5).77 They would have returned to Alexander by March of 323 (the “now” of Dinarchus’ speech). Dinarchus suggests that Alexander might well demand his money back because: (1) Demosthenes had moved that the Athenians repay Alexander; (2) the Areopagus had published an account of the missing money; (3) Alexander had in his possession slaves who could inform the Athenians of anything they had missed. Athens was not in a position to repay the king, Dinarchus says, and might be forced to go to war instead.

We can make four important observations based on the evidence for Harpalus, Macedonian efforts to retrieve him, and the Athenians’ reactions. First, Athens did not admit Harpalus as an act of defiance against Macedonian power. Despite Plutarch’s comment that the Athenians were “equipping themselves against Alexander” (κορυσσομένων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ) (Mor. [De Vit. Pud.] 531a), it is clear that the Athenians were frightened of Alexander and had no intention of going to war if it could be avoided.78 Dinarchus says that Athens at first thought Harpalus’ fleet to be invading (In Arist. 4), and when it was clear that he was a fugitive the assembly voted to prevent his entry (Din. In Phil. 1, 7). Once Harpalus was admitted, Demosthenes’ argument won the day by promising that “there would be no blame from Alexander because of the man” (οὔτε δεῖν αἰτίαν οὐδεμίαν τῶι δήμωι di*) ἐκεῖνον παρ?̓ Ἀλεξάνδρου καταλείπεσθαι ) (Hyp. In Dem. 18).

Second, we can observe that almost a year later the idea of war with Macedonia seemed ludicrous, at least to a significant number of Athenians. Dinarchus asks Demosthenes, rhetorically, “Would you propose that we fight a war, since you so successfully managed our previous wars?” (γρά[ψ]εις σὺ Δημόσθενες πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς πρότερον πολέμους καλῶς διῴκησας; ) (In Dem. 69). The orator seeks to panic the jurors at this prospect: he says that Demosthenes has put them in “the most terrible misfortunes” (τὰ δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ) (77); he says that the trial “concerns the safety of the whole city” (περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης ) (88); he recalls the destruction of Olynthus and Thebes by Macedonian hands (26), and forecasts such a disaster for Athens (99): And you and the whole people are in danger of losing the foundations of your city, and your ancestral temples, and your children, and your wives. καὶ ὑμεῖς μὲν καὶ δῆμος ἅπας κινδυνεύῃ περὶ τοῦ ἐδάφους τοῦ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν πατρῴων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν.

This is all very hysterical, but had Dinarchus not thought that his dire predictions would resonate with the jury, they would not appear in this speech. Athens feared Alexander in June of 324, when Harpalus first arrived, and still did so in March of 323, only a few months before the king’s death.

The third observation is surprising given the previous two: Despite the Athenians’ interest in avoiding conflict with Alexander, they did not release Harpalus to any of the Macedonians who demanded him. All three had excellent credentials: Olympias was the king’s mother, Antipater commanded the Macedonian armies in Europe, and Philoxenus was an officer closely associated with Alexander in Asia. Any one of these could have claimed authority as Alexander’s representative over Harpalus and his money, and their envoys suggest strongly that they did so. Somehow, though, the Athenians were persuaded that the safer course, the course least likely to anger Alexander, was to deny all three requests. In Athenian eyes, it would seem that the only Macedonian who could speak for Alexander was Alexander.

Fourth, and most important for our analysis of Macedonian hegemony: Despite the Athenians’ refusal to surrender Harpalus, and despite their having lost Alexander’s money, the dire consequences Dinarchus and Hyperides claim to fear never materialized. Neither Olympias, nor Antipater, nor Philoxenus, nor Alexander himself took any steps that we hear of either to secure Harpalus’ money or to punish the Athenians for their intransigence. The Athenians and their allies did go to war with Antipater in late 323, but this so-called Lamian War was prompted by Alexander’s death, was directed specifically at Antipater, and was begun by a vote in the Athenian assembly (Hyp. Epit. 3, 10-11); it cannot be seen as a result of the Harpalus Affair.

The preceding discussion of the Harpalus Affair and the Macedonian embassies serves to found our subsequent analysis of Macedonian hegemony. Why did the Athenians feel free to reject the demands of three Macedonian embassies? Or rather, how could the Athenians simultaneously fear Macedonian power and reject the authority of high-ranking Macedonians? To compose an answer to these questions requires discussion of the structures of Macedonian hegemony in Greece from Alexander’s departure in 335 until his death in 323. In the next chapter, we will begin with Antipater.

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Note 22  

Arr. 3.6.5; Plut. Alex. 10.1-4; Curt. 10.1.45. For a full discussion of Harpalus’ career, see S. Jaschinski (1981) 7-35.

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Note 23  

A.B. Bosworth (1980) 336-337, casts doubt on whether Harpalus controlled all of Alexander’s treasure; cf., too, F. Schachermeyr (1973) 231, 293; E. Badian (1961) 26-27.

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Note 24  

See, for example, H. Berve (1926) 76; F. Schachermeyr (1973) 231. E. Badian (1960) 243, supposes that Harpalus fled in anger because Alexander had replaced him in his job with Philoxenus and Coeranus (Arr. 3.27.4). W. Heckel (1977) 133, argues that Tauriscus convinced Harpalus to embezzle money and flee, and that Philoxenus and Coeranus were appointed after the desertion, to fill the empty post. A.B. Bosworth (1980) 284, argues that Harpalus fled Asia in the belief that Alexander would be defeated - this was a widespread assumption before Issus (Diod. 17.32.4; Joseph. AJ 11.314-316; Aesch. In Ctes. 164). I. Worthington (1984), argues, against all of these models, that Harpalus had been diverting funds from the treasury for some time, was found out and fled. He notes, (p. 164) contra Bosworth, that there had been no failure of confidence among Macedonians just before the battle at Granicus a year earlier. Alexander was lenient toward Harpalus, Worthington argues, because in the early years of his Asian wars, Alexander thought of his treasury as “spoils”, rather than “revenue”.

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Note 25  

R. Lane-Fox (1973) 411; P. Green (1991) 222. Both scholars think that Harpalus was sent to spy on the Greeks, although we might wonder why Alexander sent Harpalus (when there were many Macedonians and pro-Macedonian Greeks in Europe already), and why he sent him to Megara; cf. I. Worthington (1984) 163.

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Note 26  

B.M. Kingsley (1986); cf. E. Carney (1988) 396 n.31. Kingsley follows A.R. Burn (1952) 81-85, in noting how precarious was Alexander’s position in the Aegean and on the western coast of Asia between 333 and 331; when Alexander was preparing to leave the coast, we cannot easily imagine him turning over his finances to a thief and deserter. Kingsley also suggests that Arrian’s account of this “first flight” is largely colored by the historian’s knowledge of the second, unambiguous, flight.

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Note 27  

For the date of the Agēn, see H. Lloyd-Jones (1966) 16-17; A. Lingua (1979) 35-36; B.M. Kingsley (1986) 168; I. Worthington (1986a) 64.

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Note 28  

See B.M. Kingsley (1986) 166 and n.13.

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Note 29  

See H. Berve (1926) nos. 231 and 676 for the surprisingly rich evidence on these two women.

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Note 30  

The chronology I present here follows in its outline that proposed by I. Worthington (1986a) which is largely based on that of E. Badian (1961) esp. 41-43.

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Note 31  

G. Colin (1925) 318; H. Berve (1926) 78; G. Colin (1934) 7; E. Badian (1961) 23 and n.46; W. Will (1983) 115; I. Worthington (1986a) 63.

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Note 32  

Arr. 6.15.3, 6.27.1, 6.27.3-4, 7.4.1, 7.6.1; Curt. 9.8.9, 9.10.21, 9.10.29, 10.1.1-2, 10.1.39; Plut. Alex. 68.4. For the definitive discussion of the details surrounding these purges, see E. Badian (1961) 16-18. Also, H. Berve (1926) vol. 1, 276, vol. 2 nos. 200, 519, 780, 785; S. Jaschinski (1981) 26-27. A.B. Bosworth (1971) 123 and n.3, thinks that Badian’s account, while generally accurate, “probably exaggerates the extent of the terror”; he does not, however, offer much contradictory evidence.

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Note 33  

To Harpalus’ fear on account of his improvidence, Worthington adds a political connection to Coenus, who was instrumental in the mutiny at Hyphasis and implicated in the murder of Parmenio. I. Worthington (1992) 41, cf. S. Jaschinski (1981) 27-28.

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Note 34  

I. Worthington (1986a) 63-64. That Harpalus left Babylon in late 325 or early 324 is widely accepted; see A. Schäfer (1887) 306; G. Colin (1925) 318; P. Cloché (1957) 266; E. Badian (1961) 24 and n.51; W. Will (1983) 116; P. Cloché (1957) 266. These contra S. Jaschinski (1981) 35, “Babylon dürfte er demnach etwa im Marz 324 verlassen haben.” J.A. Goldstein (1968) 45, quotes Theophr. Char. 3.3 and Vegetius 4.39 for a mid-March beginning of the sailing season.

Worthington is the only scholar to have addressed the problem of the weight of Harpalus’ money, although he argues specifically regarding the 700 talents Harpalus eventually brought into Athens; see I. Worthington (1986) 223 and n.8. There he concludes that a sum of money having a value of 700 silver talents - 18 tons if actually silver, and 1.8 tons if gold - would easily fit in two ships. Likewise, if we accept the figure of 25.87 kg per Attic/Euboean talent ( OCD 2 s.v. “Weights”), then the 5000 talents would weigh approximately 140 tons, if silver, and 14 tons, if gold. Worthington directs us to Din. 1.89 and Hyp. 5.8, 31, where we find Harpalus dispensing bribes in gold. As additional evidence that Harpalus’ money was in gold, I would offer that Plutarch (Mor. 846a) says that Harpalus arrived with dareikoi/, referring to the gold Daric; this detail would not be worth much but that Plutarch immediately quotes Philochorus (FGrH 328 F 163), suggesting that he might have had relatively good information here. Thus we can assume a weight of 14 tons, which should have been an easy cargo for 30 ships.

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Note 35  

E. Badian (1961) 30 and n.96, 42; I. Worthington (1986a) 62.

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Note 36  

R. Sealey (1960).

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Note 37  

This passage has led some to believe that Harpalus came to Greece after the Olympic festival in July/August: C.D. Adams (1901) 124-130; A. Körte (1924) 219 n.3; H. Berve (1926) 78-79 and n.2; and most recently, S. Jaschinski (1981) 62, who says that Harpalus arrived, “Kurze zeit nach der Verkündung des Verbanntendekrest in Olympia”. The evidence regarding Philocles, discussed just below, shows that Harpalus must have reached Athens before the end of July, and so the excitement over Nicanor must have arisen upon his arrival, well before the formal announcement at Olympia. M. Errington (1990) 105-107, offers a concise critique of Jaschinski’s chronology.

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Note 38  

Cf. J.K. Davies (1971) 540; I. Worthington (1986a) 64 n.19.

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Note 39  

W.B. Dinsmoor (1931) 372, 429; cf. E. Badian (1961) 42; I. Worthington (1986a) 64-65.

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Note 40  

E. Badian (1961) 42-43 prefers the second or third week of July; I. Worthington (1986a) 65 prefers the end of June, on the assumption that a fugitive would be considerably more hasty than a diplomat.

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Note 41  

H. Bengtson (1965) 329.

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Note 42  

N.G. Ashton (1983) 47-63; P. Cloché (1957) 267; I. Worthington (1986) 223, cf. H. Berve (1926) 78; I. Worthington (1992) 49-50. We might compare the rancor with which the pseudo-Demosthenic speech “On the Treaties with Alexander” mentions Macedonian effrontery in sailing a single warship into the Piraeus (Dem. 17.23).

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Note 43  

I. Worthington (1986), contributes a full discussion of inscriptional and textual evidence for these ships. E. Badian (1961) 31, 37 and n.161, and more recently N.G. Ashton (1983) 57 and n.46, argue that Harpalus returned with three ships. H. Berve (1926) 138, and W. Will (1983) 118, argue for two. Worthington suggests that, befitting a suppliant, Harpalus returned with only one or two triremes, and that others followed later, perhaps after his imprisonment.

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Note 44  

N.G. Ashton (1983) 51; E. Badian (1961) 31 and n.106; P. Cloché (1957) 266-267; A.W. Pickard-Cambridge (1914) 452; I. Worthington (1986) 223. Ashton and Pickard-Cambridge think that Philocles was bribed to admit Harpalus. Dinarchus does not actually say, in his speech against Philocles, that the man admitted Harpalus; the closest he comes is this (1-2): …καὶ ἐψευσμένος ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίον καὶ τῶν περιεστηκότων, φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταπλεῦς[αι], στρατηγὸς u(f*) ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Μουνιχίαν καὶ τὰ νεώρια κεχειροτονημένος… (“…and lying before all the Athenians and those standing around, saying that he would prevent Harpalus from sailing into the Piraeus, having been appointed by you as general over Munichia and the dockyards…”).

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Note 45  

See E. Badian (1961) 43; J.A. Goldstein (1968) 45; S. Jaschinski (1981) 38; W. Will (1983) 119; I. Worthington (1986a) 50, 66.

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Note 46  

The order of events here has been much debated, but Worthington’s arguments are decisive. G. Colin (1925) 41, and P. Cloché (1957) 271, would see Harpalus escaping before Demosthenes left for Olympia. Worthington notes, however, that Demosthenes is not likely to have been appointed ἀρχεθέωρος under those circumstances, so he must have gone before Harpalus fled. E. Badian (1961) 42-43, raises the possibility that Harpalus fled while Demosthenes was away, but if so, it would have been hard for Hyperides (In Dem. 12) to accuse Demosthenes of relaxing the vigilance of the man’s guards. The sensible sequence of events, then, puts Harpalus’ escape after Demosthenes’ return. See I. Worthington (1986a) 66-67.

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Note 47  

Further evidence for the date of the Areopagus’ report comes from a fragment of Timocles’ comedy Dēlos (F. 4, ed. B. Snell, apud Athen. 8.341a-342a). The lines list Athenians whom Harpalus bribed: Demosthenes, Moirocles, Demo, Callisthenes, and most startling, Hyperides. It seems most likely that this list is not based on the report, but a joke in anticipation of it. We may assume that the play pre-dated publication of the Areopagus’ report. The comedy must have been performed at either the Lenaea, in February 323, or the Dionysia, in late March; this fits well with Dinarchus’ claim of a six-month investigation, which would have ended in February or March. See E. Badian (1961) 42; I. Worthington (1986a) 68-69; R. Sealey (1993) 266.

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Note 48  

There is a tendency to see the debate over Harpalus as one between pro- and anti-Macedonian parties - the “pro” being represented by Demosthenes, and the “anti” by the orators who will later prosecute him for corruption, Hyperides and Dinarchus - but the matter is not nearly that straightforward. As C. Mossé writes, “The facts are known to us chiefly through the speech that Hyperides composed against Demosthenes, and this is the disturbing factor, for if the accusation had come from a member of the pro-Macedonian party it could easily have been written off as a calumny, the verdict of the Areopagus would have been suspect, and the misappropriation of funds, if indeed it had taken place, would have been ascribed to the orator’s patriotism; but the presence of Hyperides among the accusers and of Demades among the accused confuses the issue, and embarrasses supporters of the over-simple theory of a straightforward antagonism between pro- and anti-Macedonians.” C. Mossé (1973) 86; cf W. Will (1983) 118; I. Worthington (1992) 42, 44.

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Note 49  

Arrian 4.10.7-9; Curtius 8.5.8, 10.2.3; Din. Dem. 112; Diod. 17.108.7; Plut. Dem. 25.5, Comp. Dem. Cic. 3.5, Alex. 55, Mor. 848f. Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions a speech by Demosthenes, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἐκδοῦναι Ἅρπαλον Ἀλεξανδρῳ, (“On Not Surrendering Harpalus”) which he describes as ou)k a)/cion a)/ra qauma/zein, (“not worthy of admiration”) (Dion. Hal. Din. 11 [660]). For discussion and bibliography see G. Colin (1925) 328; I. Worthington (1992) 45 n.18.

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Note 50  

C.D. Adams (1901) 134-135. Also, H. Bengtson (1937) 127 n.5: “Daß Philoxenos in höchsteigener Person in Athen erschienen sei, ist nur eine von den zahlreichen Flüchtigkeiten, die sich Plutarch bei der Auswertung von historischem Material hat zuschulden kommen lassen.” This contra: A. Schäfer (1887) 309 n.2; A.W. Pickard-Cambridge (1914) 452.

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Note 51  

We will examine further the seeming inconsistency between Hyperides and Plutarch’s evidence; see below, page 23.

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Note 52  

H. Berve (1926) 390.

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Note 53  

H. Berve (1926) 389-390; E. Badian (1965) 168-169.

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Note 54  

I. Worthington (1984a).

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Note 55  

Not all comment, of course: J.R. Hamilton (1973) 138; R. Sealey (1993) 256; L. Tritle (1988) 119; N.G.L. Hammond (1989) 172.

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Note 56  

G. Colin (1934) 9. This is in keeping with his opinion expressed earlier, Colin (1925) 328 (although here he does mention that Demosthenes might have been in a delicate position if he had to choose between three prominent Macedonians). Also, more recently, W. Will (1983) 121, sees no particular problem with three embassies.

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Note 57  

“Argument raged as to whether Harpalus should or should not be surrendered - and if so, to whom.” P. Green (1970) 252.

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Note 58  

“Aber die Auslieferungsforderung, welche der König durch Philoxenus, zugleich Antipatros und Olympias aus eigener Initiative an Athen ergehen ließen shuf eine newe Lage.” H. Berve (1926) 79. With him: P. Cloché (1957) 268; J.A. Goldstein (1968) 38.

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Note 59  

E. Badian (1961) 36.

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Note 60  

R. Sealey (1993) 213.

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Note 61  

K.J. Beloch (1923) 59.

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Note 62  

C. Mossé (1973) 87; S. Jaschinski (1981) 42-43.

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Note 63  

I. Worthington (1984a).

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Note 64  

I. Worthington (1984a) 48. I devote so much attention here to Worthington’s article because it is the only protracted discussion of this problem, and raises the important issues relevant to our sources for the Macedonian envoys. It is only right to note that Worthington seems to have changed his view toward accepting the possibility of requests other than Philoxenus’. ‘It is odd that Philoxenus should be involved and not Antipater, the regent of Greece, although Ps.-Plutarch (Mor. [Vit. X. Or.] 846b) notes that the Athenians wished to surrender Harpalus to Antipater, and Diodorus (17.108.7) tells us that envoys arrived from Antipater and also from the king’s mother Olympias. Philoxenus may well have sent an embassy that later prompted Antipater to follow suit’; I. Worthington (1992) 44. While many of my conclusions regarding the envoys agree with this statement, there has not been, to my knowledge, a systematic rehabilitation of Antipater’s and Olympias’ embassies to Athens.

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Note 65  

For the abstract uses of e)pifai/nw, especially in the passive, cf. Hdt. 2.152, 4.122, Thuc. 8.42.

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Note 66  

σεε ι. ωορτηινγτον ῾198?̓ .

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Note 67  

For a suggested scheme of how the demands for Harpalus fit into a chronology of the Harpalus Affair, see below, page 29.

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Note 68  

I. Worthington (1984a) 48.

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Note 69  

See G. Genette’s description of history as διηγήσις as opposed to μιμήσις. “Frontières du récit”, Figures II (Seuil, 1969) 30, quoted in P. Veyne (1971) 5.

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Note 70  

S. Todd (1990) 173.

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Note 71  

I. Worthington (1992) 54.

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Note 72  

I. Worthington (1984a) 48.

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Note 73  

E. Badian (1961) 36 n.155.

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Note 74  

A.W. Pickard-Cambridge (1914) 453; cf. P. Green (1970) 252, A.B. Bosworth (1988) 217.

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Note 75  

α.β. βοσωορτη ῾198?̓ 217 ν.33 , νοτες τηατ ἅμα ηερε δοες νοτ ξορρελατε τηε αρριϝαλ οφ ηαρπαλυς ανδ πηιλοχενυς’ ενϝοψς, ονλψ τηατ τηεψ ωερε βρουγητ το τηε ασσεμβλψ ατ τηε σαμε τιμε.

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Note 76  

For discussion of a)po/fasis and the Areopagus’ investigation, see I. Worthington (1986b).

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Note 77  

I. Worthington (1992) 232-233.

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Note 78  

Pace N.G. Ashton (1983).

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